Go Around

[nosrev16]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSJdTRA9QlE

[Magoo]

Wow, I'm glad I'm not flying with this guy! 

[John H Watson]

Wow, I'm glad I'm not flying with this guy! 

Do you mean the guy in the left seat?

[Magoo]

Yes, he shouldn't be touching the controls at all until he says "I have control!"

[Martin Baker]

I'd be interested to know what the professionals make of it, but my first thought on watching was that if this crew had been flying Asiana 214 into SFO, the accident wouldn't have happened.

[MFarhadi]

Disclaimer: I don't have PIC experience on multi-crew transport jets, only SIC a.k.a. First Officer. So, I'm not going to "Invent" anything here: just the stuff I've been taught and the books I've read.

I never really liked it when somebody was "Guarding" the yoke, as I always felt their involuntary inputs or obstruction of controls, especially during times when extra control inputs were required, e.g., gusty wind landings.

According to the prevailing training methods (between 2017 and 2022, haven't flown since) at ATR Training Centre and Airbus Training Centre Europe (I don't have any experience on Boeing Aircraft), and Aircraft FCTMs (Flight Crew Training/Technique Manuals), the Pilot Monitoring needs to have unobstructed reach to any flight control interfaces such as Yokes, Sidesticks, and Rudder Pedals. This is to be able to assume control instinctively and without delays while avoiding any interferences causing dual inputs without proper control transfer procedures until absolutely necessary for the interest of the safety of the flight (last part is just my 2 cents on PIC's right to violate any regulations for the safety of the flight, inferred from ICAO Annex 2 §2.3.1).

I'm not going to judge anybody from a 2-dimensional incomplete non-evidentiary video with lacking pre-context, but I particularly don't like to see anyone responding to a sudden go-around call from ATC, especially this close to the ground, before establishing a safe climbing flight path; remember: "Fly, Navigate, Communicate," In this order, with appropriate tasksharing. Standard Procedures are there for some reason: to prevent confusion and improve cockpit management.

Apart from a couple of hours instructing new folks in the simulator for MCC, I'm not qualified to grade or critique crew's performance; however, during highly demanding situations such as a low-altitude go-around, sticking to well-tested standard procedures will mostly keep you out of trouble. Over the years, I've had a few dozen go-arounds, and I never forget my first one: it was messy and confusing as hell! I think it always boils down to Prior Preparation. If you arrange your mindset to always have a plan or expectation of things going wrong, you'd rarely be caught off-guard.

[MFarhadi]

... if this crew had been flying Asiana 214 into SFO, the accident wouldn't have happened.

I believe, according to NTSB FDR Animation and Commentary which can be found Here, the main contributing factor to the departure from desired flight path was usage of FLCH SPD when intercepting the vertical flight path from above. The incorrect use of automation, accompanied with lack of situational awareness which was a direct result of not comprehensively understanding the FMA, especially HOLD annunciation in the A/T status column, led the aircraft into a low-energy state, just before the touchdown.

Of course, having PF's hand on throttles while handflying close to the ground can be beneficial; but having both PF and PM's hands on controls, does not provide protection against complacency regarding standard procedures and the loss of situational awareness. If anything, I personally bet that it would even increase the chance of such events when the crew don't respect "Who's who in the Zoo," referring to correct understanding of proper tasksharing and the importance of active monitoring role of PM: actively engaging in "Mentally" flying the aricraft, through the act of effective monitoring.

[DogsEarsUp]

I believe, according to NTSB FDR Animation and Commentary which can be found Here, the main contributing factor to the departure from desired flight path was usage of FLCH SPD when intercepting the vertical flight path from above. The incorrect use of automation, accompanied with lack of situational awareness which was a direct result of not comprehensively understanding the FMA, especially HOLD annunciation in the A/T status column, led the aircraft into a low-energy state, just before the touchdown.

Forgive uninformed comment, but... These may have been contributory factors - the fact remains that 3 professional pilots continued an un-stabilised approach and quite literally flew the thing into the ground. At any point, any one of them could have been monitoring airspeed, rate of descent, flightpath - the fact that they didn't strikes me as an absolute failure of airmanship - sorry to be harsh

[MFarhadi]

Forgive uninformed comment, but... These may have been contributory factors - the fact remains that 3 professional pilots continued an un-stabilised approach and quite literally flew the thing into the ground. At any point, any one of them could have been monitoring airspeed, rate of descent, flightpath - the fact that they didn't strikes me as an absolute failure of airmanship - sorry to be harsh

Your comment is as to-the-point as it can be. Unfortunately, you're 100% right. Two professional pilots, 3 professional pilots, 100 professional pilots (IDK, how many you can fit in the pit), if are sleepy and exhausted, if not trained well, if not supervised well, it won't make the harsh truth any less bitter. However, one only might see from afar, but can only judge by the touch!
Failure of airmanship is a result, I infer. The buck needs to stop somewhere. I don't think Emirates flight 521 was a coincidence, too. Make the crew so dependant on automation, now take it away; the airmanship flies outta the window, I kid you not.
One reason why sticking to Standard Operating Procedures save lives is developing habits.
Never, under no circumstance, continue an unstable approach; you won't strike the seawall and shred into pieces.
Never, under no circumstance, intercept glide path from above with FLCH SPD and A/T in HOLD, only 1,500' AGL; you won't strike the seawall and shred into pieces.
And last thing, complacency can be prevented; but plain human errors might sometimes slip away. It wasn't so late that I realized no one is immune from making errors. The secret sauce is, don't make the ones which kill you. Everybody needs to learn that it might happen to them too. Someday, somewhere, maybe "I" am the one who makes that One mistake; on that day, the only thing that saves lives is SOPs.

[Britjet]

Looks like a training flight to me. Nevertheless the Capt needs to think about how it must make the FO feel. A lot of ego going on here..

[Bluestar]

I'm not going to be critical of the guy in the left seat. I've been there.

We don't know what caused the missed approach and the experience level/training history of the guy in the right seat.     

[Magoo]

Not discussing the go around, discussing the guarding the controls in such a way that it looks like he's flying with the F/O.

[IefCooreman]

I'm not going to be critical of the guy in the left seat. I've been there.

We don't know what caused the missed approach and the experience level/training history of the guy in the right seat.

I think it's a standard ATC called go-around, don't see any other reason as he is nicely established on the ILS.

An ATC requested go-around close to the minimums is an SOP. A perfect opportunity to see if the trainee is proficient. Immediatly jumping in with the hands on the throttles is not done.

Training is about getting the best out of the worst, not doubting the best so they become the worst.

[Hardy Heinlin]

After the first go-around call it takes about 1 second until the captain touches the throttles. At that moment, so it seems to me, the F/O still doesn't advance the throttles. So the captain pushes them forward. At the same time the second go-around call occurs.

Before the go-around, the captain keeps his left hand near the yoke, but his hand is always wide open. During the initial go-around the captain keeps his hand on the yoke mainly in order to push the ATC talk button on the yoke probably. During the second approach he keeps his hand closer to the yoke. Having noticed the F/O's slow response during the go-around, the captain maybe expected further slow responses during the final landing?

[IefCooreman]

He has his hands on the yoke in other videos as well, even on takeoff. The left hand behaviour could be a former military instructor habit. I was told they tend to do that in the fighters but the big differences are 1) fighters train to fly on the limit and 2) it is not visible to the trainee (no mental effect).

On commercial airliners you don't fly on the limit and the requirement for "immediate" reaction is only limited to a handfull of situations where in many cases you see the problem develop over time. Point here is: there is time to react.

From a training point of view (or even normal crew ops) there can be no confusion. Either you let the trainee fly, or you announce and take over control fully. Trainees are briefed to let go everything when the instructor announces "I have control".

Pushing the throttles without announcement is very confusing to the flying pilot. We have seen a very nice example recently on an Air France B777 of what happens if you start to fly like this. Nobody knows what is happening anymore, and in the end everybody blames the aircraft.

https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/opposing-dual-inputs-confused-air-france-777-pilots-during-paris-go-around/156524.article

[Hardy Heinlin]

The pilots made simultaneous inputs for 53s and for 12s the controls were desynchronised. Crew co-operation, says the inquiry, was "severely disrupted" with non-standard call-outs and no proper division of tasks.

Analysis of the event shows the captain made nose-down inputs while the first officer made emphasised nose-up inputs. The aircraft's pitch reached a maximum of 24°, much higher than the typical 15° for a go-around.

Wow, that's impressive indeed ...

[Bluestar]

The left hand behaviour could be a former military instructor habit. I was told they tend to do that in the fighters but the big differences are 1) fighters train to fly on the limit and 2) it is not visible to the trainee (no mental effect).

When I was flying in the Vietnam War it was not unusual for both pilots to have their hands on the controls when making an approach where we were going to receive fire.

I never saw or knew a military instructor who would fly with the left hand behavior shown in the above referenced video.  It is possible that I am wrong on this since I was only an IP for five years.   

[boeing747430]

I was waiting for this discussion to start as soon as the link had beem posted here.

The only excuse I could see would be company procedures. Otherwise, I'd see it as a bad habit. Anyway, I'm not a fan and such behaviour is discouraged at my company. Yes, there may be a situation, maybe just before crashing, in which this behaviour could be justified, but I didn't see any urgency here. Looks very patronising.

Air France's 777 in Paris was in a dangerous situation, just because both pilots were at the controls and Asiana in SFO would very likely have happened anyway, because it happened due to a loss in situational awareness of the whole cockpit crew.

When I switched back from A320s to 747, it took me some time to get used to not having my hands on the yoke, as opposed to one loosely touching the sidestick, but there is a different philosophy behind this (and a warning for ,,dual input").

[Bluestar]

I showed this to a warbird buddy of mine who is a retired check airman.  He has a very different take on this situation.  From the video it appeared to him that the co-pilot was either new or had known issues.  On the second approach it appeared to him that the Captain still had a pretty good grip on the controls. 

[IefCooreman]

From the video it appeared to him that the co-pilot was either new or had known issues.

Common debrief in training when I'm "pilot flying" in both FO and CPT training:
"Did you spot the roll to the right/left on takeoff?" (right in FO training, left in CPT training)
"Yes"
"You realise that was you talking to ATC?"
"No"

There is no point pointing at someone else to justify own behaviour that could create problems as well. Because that sounds like a 'battle of the stripes'.