Sad: Atlas 767F down near Houston

[cavaricooper]

As a frequent customer I can attest that their packing is normally unrpoportionally large for the ordered item. I have seen small but fragile items in a huge box with lots of air cushions. Even non-fragile items are delivered in normally oversized boxes.

No complaints, but I do see where this could be much lighter than standard industrial bulk or boxed
shipments or a single generator etc.

C

[Mariano]

Regarding Amazon cargo.

Sometimes we fly containers filled with boxes being shipped to homes/business (lighter cargo) and sometimes we also fly heavier pallets loaded with inventory of all sizes and weights being moved between warehouses for logistics positioning. Most of the time, it's a combination of both.

Best regards,

Mariano

[emerydc8]

And sometimes it's hard to tell who you're flying for.

[Mariano]

And that, yes. 😂

Mariano

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

I don't understand why Amazon freight should be lighter than other average freight. Amazon sells all kinds of products, not just popcorn.

My (personal) reasoning is that Amazon packages are not average freight. A large amount of stuff Amazon ships is a small item in an oversize box. It's a lot of air, compared to shipments that are prepared for airlift. Assuming, of course, that there are actual end-addressee packages in those containers -- and here I may make a crucial mistake. If Amazon merely ships between warehouses, they probably pack their containers as tightly as anybody else.


Hoppie

[emerydc8]

We're regularly leaving the DHL hub (night sort) with 110,000 - 120,000 pounds of freight, which puts us very close to our 326,000 pound landing weight limit. With only 24 positions (ULDs), they must be packing them pretty tight.

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

Yet another theory down the drain. With most/all cargo in containers, cargo shift isn't likely anyway.

[emerydc8]

Well, that flight was not coming from the hub and it wasn't a DHL flight, so I can't speak for the kind of loads they're carrying between MIA and IAH.

[G-CIVA]

So with that theory thoroughly washed down the drain can we respectfully now stop the speculation.

Only the remains of two of the crew have been recovered from the debris field, I doubt whether they have yet to be released to the families - it is only then than the processing of grief can begin - this is a process that never ends for the next-of-kin & wider families of the lost crew.

For the family of the still missing crew member - the search continues.

We are privileged to have amongst our number Jon & Mario who fly this aircraft type as professionals, just for a second before you feel like a little more 'Monday Morning Quarterbacking' put yourselves in their shoes.

We will find out what happened, when it happened, how it happened & why it happened & what will be put in place to ever prevent it from happening again in due course as the investigation reaches the fullness of its outcome.  If you want to speculate then go & do that on one of the myriad of other 'aviation' related websites out there.

Sorry for being blunt.

Best Regards

Steve

[emerydc8]

We are privileged to have amongst our number Jon & Mario who fly this aircraft type as professionals, just for a second before you feel like a little more 'Monday Morning Quarterbacking' put yourselves in their shoes.

Personally, I don't fault anyone for asking what happened. We're all wondering -- probably we pilots who fly the airplane more than others. If it turns out to be something that could be prevented by getting information out to the flight crews, I suspect that information will filter down from our FAA Certificate Management Teams well before the final report.

[United744]

When the news first broke my thoughts turned immediately to a friend who has flown *that* 767.   Thankfully they are OK.

Hearing it was in a "steep nose-down attitude" makes me think something catastrophic occurred.

I understand there was weather right where they were and aircraft were vectoring around it, but I'm not sure how bad it was (CB?).

I'm not going to join the speculation, but whatever happened I think was pretty sudden as after they received a weather report and started descent, nothing was heard from them again.

My condolences to their families.

I hope they can determine the cause - as SR111 showed - an aircraft crashing in that situation leaves a massive jigsaw puzzle that takes years to re-build.

From what I understand their routes are fairly random. They seem to fly all over the place, not just between Amazon hubs. I think it is where they best fit the goals of Amazon rather than because of any particular routing.

I think they're packed in tight - Amazon didn't start this operation without ruthless efficiency in mind.

[John H Watson]

Flight recorder found.

https://www.pprune.org/10405959-post259.html

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

Good. We have both now. Let's see what happened. Usually some prelim facts-only stuff appears in a few days.

Hoppie

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

http://avherald.com/h?article=4c497c3c&opt=0

On Mar 5th 2019 the NTSB reported the download of the CVR was successfully completed, the last portion of the accident flight is available on the 2 hours' recording, the quality of the recording however is poor and it was difficult to determine what was being said, occasionally required advanced filter techniques. The aircraft was being vectored for an approach to Houston Intercontinental's airport's runway 26L. The NTSB stated: "Crew communications consistent with a loss control of the aircraft began approximately 18 seconds prior to the end of the recording." The FDR was also successfully read out, 54 hours of flight data spanning 17 flights were downloaded. The recorder stores about 350 parameters. The investigators are currently verifying and validating the FDR data. A transcript of the CVR is estimated to be compiled during the next week (Mar 11th and following).

I would not be surprised if this 27-year old airframe never got a recorder upgrade.

/-/

[cagarini]

I hope that they can still track the required info to get some light over what really happened with that aircraft, and the souls in it.

[John H Watson]

As mentioned on PPRuNe.org, here's what looks like the stabilizer ballsscrew...

https://youtu.be/qOa4V4JF4t4?t=268

Atlas part comparison

It looks ok, in the sense that the screw itself doesn't look shredded (as in the Alaskan Airlines accident) and the gimbal hasn't parted from the ballscrew.

[John H Watson]

The Atlas was a 767-300

The stabilizer mechanical limits are 0~14.2 units (approx 1 deg/unit)
Column switch limits are between 0.25 and 12.8 units
Neutral position is at 2 units.

Note dimension "A" in the diagram above.

767-300 AIRPLANES;
for all stabilizer trim modes, except alternate trim mode, the
stabilizer leading edge DOWN limit is -11.00 degree stabilizer
angle, or 12.8 units of trim on the position indicators, or
Dimension A is 22.43 inches (569.7 mm). The flaps retracted/not
retracted position determines the leading edge UP limit.
When the flaps are UP (retracted), the leading edge UP limit is 0.50 degree
stabilizer angle, or 1.5 units of trim, or Dimension A is 3.00
inches (76.2 mm).
When the flaps are DOWN (not retracted), the leading edge UP limit is 1.75 degree
stabilizer angle, or 0.25 unit of trim, or Dimension A is 0.92 inch

So with flaps extended to 5 units, the jackscrew range is 21.51 inches. With flaps not extended, the jackscrew range is is only 19.43 inches.

Without a clearer photograph, and without knowing the diameter of the jackscrew, it would be hard to say what the stab trim setting was (but I'd say a few degrees nose up).

[John H Watson]

On Mar 12th 2019 the NTSB provided an update stating:

The wreckage was situated in a shallow muddy swamp area, and the main debris field was oriented east to west and about 350 yards long by about 200 yards wide (figure 1). One engine and some landing gear components were found beyond the main debris field to the west. Less dense components and a large portion of the cargo floated southward and were recovered up to 20 miles away.

The NTSB reported:

Air traffic control communications and radar data indicated the flight was normal from Miami to the Houston terminal area. About 12:30 pm the pilots contacted the Houston terminal radar approach control (TRACON) arrival controller and reported descending for runway 26L; the airplane was at 17,800 ft with a ground speed 320 knots.

At 12:34, the airplane was descending through 13,800 ft, and the controller advised of an area of light to heavy precipitation along the flight route and that they could expect vectors around the weather.

About 12:35, the flight was transferred to the Houston TRACON final controller, and the pilot reported they had received the Houston Automatic Terminal Information System weather broadcast. The controller told the pilots to expect vectors to runway 26L and asked if they wanted to go to the west or north of the weather.

Radar data indicated the airplane continued the descent through 12,000 ft with a ground speed of 290 knots, consistent with the arrival procedure. The pilots responded that they wanted to go to the west of the area of precipitation. The controller advised that to do so, they would need to descend to 3,000 ft expeditiously.

About 12:37, the controller instructed the pilots to turn to a heading of 270°. Radar data indicated the airplane turned, and the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated a selected heading of 270°. The airplane was descending through 8,500 ft at this time.

About 12:38, the controller informed the pilots that they would be past the area of weather in about 18 miles, that they could expect a turn to the north for a base leg to the approach to runway 26L, and that weather was clear west of the precipitation area. The pilots responded, "sounds good" and "ok." At this time, radar and ADS-B returns indicated the airplane levelled briefly at 6,200 ft and then began a slight climb to 6,300 ft.

Also, about this time, the FDR data indicated that some small vertical accelerations consistent with the airplane entering turbulence. Shortly after, when the airplane's indicated airspeed was steady about 230 knots, the engines increased to maximum thrust, and the airplane pitch increased to about 4° nose up and then rapidly pitched nose down to about 49° in response to column input. The stall warning (stick shaker) did not activate.

FDR, radar, and ADS-B data indicated that the airplane entered a rapid descent on a heading of 270°, reaching an airspeed of about 430 knots. A security camera video captured the airplane in a steep, generally wings-level attitude until impact with the swamp. FDR data indicated that the airplane gradually pitched up to about 20 degrees nose down during the descent.

Gregory Allen "Greg" Feith is an American former Senior Air Safety Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Today on Denver News Channel 9, while commenting on the 737 Max crashes, Greg Feith said this, verbatim:

...and a lot of carriers overseas, they are so automation dependent that they don't know, based on their training, when to intervene, and if there is a problem they continue to try to use the automation. We've seen that now in three accidents. Lion Air, Ethiopian, and in fact, Atlas Air, the one that crashed in Houston. The automation was still coupled, the pilots didn't hand fly the airplane when they lost control and even through the recovery they were fighting the automation.

[Chris Kilroy]

Interesting that the NTSB has since revised the following passage from:

... rapidly pitched nose down to about 49° in response to column input

to

The airplane then pitched nose down over the next 18 seconds to about 49° in response to nose-down elevator deflection.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA19MA086.aspx

The way it was initially worded could have definitely led to certain conclusions being drawn. The new wording, not as much.

[United744]

...when the airplane's indicated airspeed was steady about 230 knots...
...engines increased to maximum thrust...
...rapidly pitched nose down to about 49°...
...The stall warning (stick shaker) did not activate...

Hmm.

in response to column input

They said it, then apparently redacted it. I would doubt they would write it if they didn't mean it.

Given everything else written, and the video, it's not looking good.

Gregory Allen "Greg" Feith

He's talking rubbish. The 737 MAX crashes and incidences have nothing to do with pilot reliance on automation. There is TOO MUCH AUTOMATION working against the pilot.

In the 737 MAX problem, the MCAS is sensing bad data, not checking it, not faulting, and instead pushing the nose over, suddenly, during critical phases of flight where the aircraft is low to the ground.

He's blaming pilots far too readily - he's not unbiased (or even accurate).