Lithium batteries in 787 may pose fire issues

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

That's no shift, it has always been cattle class.

It's a shift in cabin luggage requirements  :-)  MUST BRING BATTERIES.

[Phil Bunch]

Here's a link to the NY Times story on the lithium battery issues:

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/business/inside-the-787-an-unsettling-risk-for-boeing.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=all

Perhaps it's a problem with a single battery vendor's design or manufacturing rather than a universal lithium battery problem for the 787...I assume they didn't single-source their batteries.

Are large lithium batteries used in other airliners to any significant extent?

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EDIT:

Another story here, with good photos of a fire-damaged 787 battery, and some videos too:

http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-18/why-the-batteries-in-boeings-787-are-burning

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

787 is the one and only carrying Li-Ion at this moment.

[Phil Bunch]

A NY Times story, with some more details is here:

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/business/boeing-closer-to-answer-on-787s-but-not-to-getting-them-back-in-air.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=all

Some news media are  beginning to compare the 787 with the star-crossed British airliner, the Comet.  Surely that's grossly inaccurate...but it of course depends on whether or not Boeing and their suppliers can come up with clear evidence that the battery problem is both understood and fixed.

Can anyone provide an estimate re the availability of suitable non-lithium batteries for the 787?  In other words, is it *technically* possible with a short-term effort to replace the lithium batteries with some other type of airliner-certified battery?   As I type this, I can't begin to imagine how much regulatory and engineering testing and certifications would be needed to swap these batteries out, even if suitable batteries are available.  It's not quite the same as swapping out one's automobile battery...

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

Next to the obvious engineering challenges of fitting dissimilar batteries (size, weight, charger, possibly even voltage as 28V is not necessarily what the batteries produce), it probably will be possible to certify the hack solution by similarity to previous aircraft. If they would take, say, the battery system of a 777, that system by itself can just bring in the 777 paperwork and be over with in a day. It's the integration with the 787 systems and airframe that will be the big effort.


Jeroen

[Richard McDonald Woods]

An interesting perspective on this in today's London Sunday Times at http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/Industry/article1197498.ece

[Phil Bunch]

Some additional technical details are provided here:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-20/boeing-787-deal-puts-battery-maker-gs-yuasa-in-spotlight.html

What a mess.  I hope they can identify a clear chain of events and the root or fundamental issues soon.  I have a faded  memory that other electrical fires, related to the circuit breaker system () developed

[Phil Bunch]

Some additional technical details in this NY Times story, dated Jan 21, 2013:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/business/global/ntsb-rules-out-a-cause-for-battery-fire-on-787-dreamliner.html?ref=todayspaper

and here:

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/business/battery-fire-resolution-may-weigh-on-boeing.html?ref=todayspaper

[Phil Bunch]

Another update by the NY Times.  

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/business/the-ntsb-sees-lengthy-inquiry-into-787-dreamliner.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=all

I wonder if the globalization of airliner design and construction isn't part of the problem?  While contractors always play critical roles in many subsystems, the more things are under one roof, the more control is available to the involved managers.  Or, perhaps that doesn't matter very much and it would simply be Boeing's job to make sure the testing and safety of the new subsystems is performed properly...

Although I worked for a large multinational company (not in the aviation industry) for my whole 31-year career, I never did figure out if they were or could be efficient or highly competent.  Mostly, I concluded there were too much politics and that the failings of real human beings operating in groups were much too strong for my taste.  Also, it was just too hard to be effective as an individual, most of the time.  As someone once said about armies, "armies are only effective because they fight against other armies".  Perhaps analogous theories apply to large companies competing with other large companies?

It will certainly be interesting to read the final report of how the apparently defective battery/electrical systems came to be accepted as safe and functional.  Is it credible that such early failures did not show up in stress testing?  Perhaps there is some test environment parameter (e.g., high altitude, cold ambient temperature, etc, etc) that wasn't fully considered.  Or, perhaps there will be a finding analogous to the metal fatigue issues that doomed the British Comet airliner?
--------------------------------------------

An excerpt from the article:

 "The expectation in aviation is to never experience a fire on an aircraft," Ms. Hersman said at a news briefing Thursday afternoon. "There are multiple systems to prevent against a battery event like this." She added: "Those systems did not work as intended. We need to understand why."

Boeing 787s were grounded last week when a second battery problem prompted a 787 in Japan to make an emergency landing. The pilot reported seeing smoke in the cockpit as battery alarms went off. While there were no injuries in either incident, Ms. Hersman said, "this is a very serious air safety concern."

The safety board's technical presentation provided the most graphic indication to date of the severity of the battery problems. Ms. Hersman highlighted the gravity of the problems more bluntly than other federal officials have done. She repeated three times that fires should never be allowed to occur on an airplane, and pointed at the failure of the safety systems that Boeing had put in place.

The battery damage was so significant, she said, that investigators were having difficulty retrieving information from the battery control system.

Unlike the Federal Aviation Administration, the safety board does not have regulatory powers but its investigations and its public recommendations can weigh heavily on air safety policy. The F.A.A. has already made clear, though, that the plane could not fly again until the cause was determined and the problem fixed.

"It means that the 787 is going to be grounded for an indefinite period — whether that's two months, four months or six months, the 787 is not going to get back in the air soon," said Scott Hamilton, managing director of the Leeham Company, an aviation consulting firm in Issaquah, Wash. "They made it just real clear today that they haven't a clue as to what happened, or why."

[torrence]

Hi Phil,

I think your comments about the efficiency of large multinational systems are certainly relevant - note this is true of Airbus also.  Although not a systems engineer or battery expert, I suspect we'll find this is not a "Comet" type of problem, where if I remember correctly the problem was unfamiliarity with the physics of hoop stresses induced by multiple pressurization-depressurization cycles (no supercomputers with finite element codes in those days).  I think the underlying issues with modern batteries are pretty well understood and result from the huge demand for exponential increases in energy density in batteries everywhere.  This can lead to design compromises and testing problems etc. I was reminded on this just yesterday when running the Google maps app on my iPhone for half an hour resulted in the phone getting almost too warm to handle.  

So my guess is that the problem will be found to be in the design of all the fault protection logic and testing etc. and perhaps some subtle battery design 'feature' - more similar to the NASA experience with the Challenger and Columbia accidents.  I think Boeing will get their arms around it (they pretty much have to) but the next chapter may be lots of diverts due to 'worry lights' from all the fault protection systems they'll throw at it to make sure they never get a fire.

Cheers,
Torrence

[Richard McDonald Woods]

Can anyone suggest why there is a need for the aircraft to have on-board batteries at all?

Surely a ground-based battery would be easy to implement? Or are there needs, other than APU starting, that require battery?

[IefCooreman]

It's the last resort when all else fails. An example: stuff like fire extinguishing is hot wired to the battery without any switch in between (hot battery bus) because it needs to be avaialble in the most extreme emergency situations. The next level is wired with a switch in between, which is the standby system (battery bus, etc...). Fire detection is on this level (if I remember...) But even the smallest switching in between degrades the safety level of the complete system.

[Phil Bunch]

Here's a link to the NTSB investigation's web site for the 787, etc:

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/boeing_787/boeing_787.html

[edit - added link to latest NTSB report:]

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2013/boeing_787/JAL_B-787_1-24-13.pdf

It would be interesting to review their investigations as they happen, but I suspect it would very quickly become a flood of very technical details and specialized engineering, all but impossible to follow as a civilian.  I wonder how much can be discovered by people who aren't highly experienced specialists in battery technologies and/or avionics.

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

The issue with such an investigation is mainly that it is not obvious what happened, therefore you need a good amount of knowledge and gut feeling and luck (chance, i.e., persistance required) to get to the bottom. Highly experienced specialists may not always be the ones that find the clue. But usually they are the ones to confirm the suspicions.


Jeroen

[John Golin]

Can anyone suggest why there is a need for the aircraft to have on-board batteries at all?

Here was a close call...

http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3440510/ao2008003.pdf

[Richard McDonald Woods]

John,
Very interesting document. Many thanks for pointing it out.

[John Golin]

I don't think I'd read it in detail before - originally it was thought all AC busses were lost, but apparently AC4 stayed in...

but a few more drops of water.... !  :shock:

Hopefully something we can play with in PSX!

[Phil Bunch]

An update from the NY Times of 2-6-13:

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/business/similar-overheating-seen-on-two-damaged-787-batteries.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=print

Here's an excerpt - it doesn't seem favorable for a quick restart of the 787.
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 TOKYO (AP) — An investigation into a lithium-ion battery that overheated on a Boeing 787 flight in Japan last month found evidence of the same type of "thermal runaway" seen in a similar earlier incident in Boston, officials said Tuesday.

The Japan Transportation Safety Board said that CT scans and other analysis found damage to all eight cells in the battery that overheated on the All Nippon Airways 787 on Jan. 16, which prompted an emergency landing and investigations by United States and Japanese aviation safety regulators.

They also found signs of short-circuiting and "thermal runaway," a chemical reaction in which a rising temperature causes progressively hotter temperatures. United States investigators found similar evidence in the battery that caught fire Jan. 7 on a Japan Airlines 787 parked in Boston.

Photos distributed by the Japanese investigators show charring of six of the eight cells in the battery and a frayed and broken earthing wire — meant to minimize the risk of electric shock.

[Phil Bunch]

Another update from the NY Times, asserting that the FAA failed to properly certify the 787's lithium batteries and their fire resistance:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/business/us-officials-fault-faa-for-missing-787-battery-risk.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0&pagewanted=all

Here's a couple of excerpts with some interesting details:
-----------------------------------
Excerpt 1:

 In searching for the cause of the fire on the plane in Boston, Ms. Hersman said the safety board was still looking at the battery's charging mechanism and potential manufacturing defects or contamination, and whether the cells were not as isolated as they should have been.

Investigators have so far ruled out two possible reasons for the short circuit — a mechanical or electrical shock from outside the battery.

"We have not yet identified what the cause of the short circuit is," she said. "We are looking at the design of the battery, at the manufacturing, and we are also looking at the cell charging. There are a lot of things we are still looking at."

Excerpt 2:

"Boeing for the first time disclosed the testing the 787 batteries had undergone before they were certified. Each component was tested separately, for more than 5,000 hours, it said. Those tests included baking the battery, crushing it and puncturing it with a nail to provoke a short circuit. Boeing also said that the plane's power systems were tested for more than 25,000 hours in labs. The battery was also tested on board an airplane, both on the ground and in flight, for more than 10,000 hours.

Boeing said it demonstrated the battery's performance in specific operating conditions, like extreme weather conditions.

But Ms. Hersman said that flight data from the Boston plane showed that the battery's voltage unexpectedly dropped from a full charge of 32 volts to 28 volts, which also suggested that problems began in one of the four-volt cells."
-----------------------------------------

I personally hope that Boeing and the other investigators can solve this puzzle soon and get these beautiful airliners back in the air...but it sounds like a fair long slog unless some sort of breakthrough insights occur and they are easy to address.

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

... asserting that the FAA failed to properly certify the 787's lithium batteries and their fire resistance.

That is not exactly what they said.

"The assumptions used to certify the batteries must be reconsidered," Ms. Hersman said.

Certification is a paper monster only. What happens is that a team of engineers, including independent, experienced senior people, together determines what would be an acceptable design and what would be an acceptable way of assuring that the design actually performs. They determine the type and number of tests, and propose a test plan.

The certification paper monster then records and tracks the production and testing so that it can be assured, with evidence, that it has been performed according to the plans.

So certification only assures that things went as planned, according to what the engineers thought was good or good enough. It does not at all guarantee anything.

In this case, the FAA now notices that the engineers from all sides must have overlooked something. It does not unvalidate the certification -- but it adds new insight. The next production and test plans will be adjusted. The certification process will be exactly the same unless somebody finds a fault in the paper monster itself.


Jeroen
not a DER, but familiar with FAA certification