Stuck at Flaps 1 Until 10,000'

[Will]

I can see both sides. Nobody wants to be told what to do.

We know that states here America can set their own rules for speed limits on roads and highways. But the Fed sets the speed limit in the sky and states are subservient, in the name of interstate commerce.

If Europe felt that it was better off approaching airspace regulation as a region and not as a collection of independent countries, that decision might foreseeably facilitate easier travel and trade everywhere. Pilots from France would know the rules in Germany.

We can talk about Brussels making some pretty silly rules and regulations, but the concept of coming together voluntarily to make the movement of free peoples easier is not one to reject a priori. And there isn't even an ideological reason to abhor the idea, as long as Germany could, if it wishes, withdraw from the EU (which it can per Article 50 of the EU treaty). States in the United States can't secede, so the Brussels/Europe arrangement is actually "freer" for the peoples of Europe than the Washington/America arrangement is.

[Britjet]

Hardy, i'm not trying to be elitist or superior with reference to experience. What I mean is that IFR operations take an awful lot of training (and experience!), and are examined as such, to do well, so why should an IMC-rated pilot who flies maybe only 5 times a year be in the same IMC area?
Airspace is crowded these days, and controllers are pressured. To complicate the crowding or increase the pressure by mixing types that are basically incompatible doesn't make sense to me.
I can't see any justification for pilots being allowed to mingle as they do in the US, for example, at intermediate 500ft levels, VFR, without even a flight plan. It is a nightmare trying to keep an eye out for "unidentified traffic - one-0-clock - 500ft feet below". I have never understood it, and I think that those hundreds of passengers sitting at the back would find it quite bizarre.
It's all about what is safest, in my opinion.
Out of interest I think that technology will render all this itrelevant before very long, as the newer jets have more efficient wings and don't need to fly as fast to get "clean".
Peter

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

I'm not entering the discussion about more/less "Brussels" here.

However, I do want to bring up that Europe is a collection of countries that are often smaller than a US state or even county. You crash right through their whole airspace in minutes flat. If there would not be some slightly larger coordination of airspace, and thus rules, you would really find yourself in a much bigger mess than today.

Hoppie

[emerydc8]

I don't know how we ever did it in the late '80's. It must have required unbelieveable aviation skills!

And all we had were Litton 51s and Tracor 7800s.

[Will]

I recognize the danger and I was always as vigilant in the cockpit as I could be. And when I jump seated, the working crew always appreciated an extra pair of eyes. But I can't recall any near misses or scary incidents with any GA aircraft. It was always looming as a possibility, but one that never materialized.

My real-life close encounters were only two, and they didn't involve private pilots. The first one happened when I was a CFI in Scottsdale, Arizona. I was instructing while a student was "under the hood" somewhere over the mountains north of Phoenix, when two F-18s screamed by at what seemed like much more than 250 kts. The student never saw them. I was impressed. We weren't on a military route.

The second happened at KSTL, when a controller cleared us to land when a different controller cleared another airliner for takeoff on a crossing runway. We saw the threat and stopped before the intersection, but it required full braking. The passengers noticed. We filed our NASA form. Never heard about the incident from anyone.

[Phil Bunch]

Here's an example of a general aviation aircraft colliding with an airliner.  Hopefully the subsequent revisions to the regulations are still adequate.   

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PSA_Flight_182

Excerpts:

Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Flight 182 was a Boeing 727-214 commercial airliner, registration, N533PS[2] that collided with a private Cessna 172 light aircraft, registration, N7711G[3] over San Diego, California, at 9:01 am on Monday, September 25, 1978. It was Pacific Southwest Airlines' first accident involving fatalities. The death toll of 144 made it the deadliest aircraft disaster in California history. Until the crash of American Airlines Flight 191 eight months later, it was also the deadliest plane crash in U.S. aviation history.

The PSA 182 accident caused the revision of air traffic rules applicable to the busiest airports across the U.S., with the intention of improving separation of aircraft operating in the vicinity of large airports.

<snip>

The Cessna was being flown by two licensed pilots. One was Martin Kazy Jr., 32, who possessed single-engine, multiengine, and instrument flight ratings, as well as a commercial certificate and an instrument flight instructor certificate. He had flown a total of 5,137 hours. The other, David Boswell, 35, a U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant, possessed single-engine and multiengine ratings and a commercial certificate. He had flown just 407 hours and, at the time of the accident, was practicing instrument landing system approaches under the instruction of Kazy in pursuit of his instrument rating. They had departed from Montgomery Field and were navigating under visual flight rules, which did not require the filing of a flight plan. Boswell was wearing a "hood" to limit his field of vision straight ahead to the cockpit panel, much like an oversized sun visor with vertical panels to block peripheral vision, which is normal in IFR training. At the time of the collision, the Cessna was on the missed approach (in visual meteorological conditions) from Lindbergh's Runway 9, heading east and climbing. The Cessna was in communication with San Diego approach control.

<snip>

As a result of the crash, the NTSB recommended the immediate implementation of a Terminal Radar Service Area around Lindbergh Field to provide for the separation of aircraft, as well as an immediate review of control procedures for all busy terminal areas. This initial rule did not include small, general-aviation aircraft. Therefore, on May 15, 1980, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), implemented what is called Class B airspace to provide for the separation of all aircraft operating in the area. Additionally, all aircraft, regardless of size, are required to operate under "positive radar control", a rule that allows only radar control from the ground for all aircraft operating in the airport's airspace.

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I am skeptical about allowing a GA aircraft to be flown near a major airport under VFR regulations while artificially limiting the pilots vision of the outside world so he can practice instrument approaches.  The article says that ILS was added to smaller nearby airports so that IFR training could be done with less mid-air collision danger to other aircraft at major airports.

[Hardy Heinlin]

Here are further examples of collisions. Why don't we make the regulations on the ground as strict as in the air? Why do we lament there but not here? Why is the tolerance greater here than it is there? This attitude is contradictory, in my opinion.


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[Will]

Hardy, I agree with you that the response to traffic deaths is very minimal compared to aircraft deaths. I think the culture has chosen to romanticize flight, and that leads to crashes being romanticized as well. Blown out of proportion.

Psychologically, I think it's also a control issue. When people drive cars, there is a sense that they are in control of their fate. But when people fly commercially, they surrender all control over to the pilots. And that makes the experience different, and makes the crashes different.

[Hardy Heinlin]

Yes, I think so too. The next step for everyone with this control issue would be to recognize this psychological effect and act accordingly.

Me, for example; I shouldn't vote for lower speed limits on the autobahn. Let them race.

[Will]

Phil,

That is a very famous crash indeed! It led to rules implementing positive radar control of all flights around major airports. I grew up and started flying after TCAs (now Class B airspace) were common, but it was that crash that created them.

There's a saying that the Federal Aviation Regulations are written in blood... because so many of them come as a response to one crash or another.

[United744]

Don't get me started on the EU!

The EU are only interested in money and power. Things will only get worse over time.

If they cared about the environment, they'd let the 744 exceed 250 below 10000 ft to save fuel and reduce emissions! Not that I care about the scam that is "climate change".

Hypocrisy everywhere.

There's a saying that the Federal Aviation Regulations are written in blood... because so many of them come as a response to one crash or another.

That is true for 99% of safety regulations regardless of industry.

What I mean is that IFR operations take an awful lot of training (and experience!), and are examined as such, to do well, so why should an IMC-rated pilot who flies maybe only 5 times a year be in the same IMC area?

Because he's trained to the same standards? Pilots who fly regularly can get complacent. Plenty of crashes to attest to that.

If you're trained, there is no problem. The only issue I see is with aircraft flying at different speeds, but pilot experience or weather conditions are irrelevant to that problem.

I used to be critical of the US way of doing things until I flew there - now I think the EU is backwards and too strict.

[torrence]

The only thing I can add technically to the discussion is to note the effects of the Mulligan's Stew of units required for operations.  Is there a push for Imperial Pints and a Plimsol line for fueling (sorry UK folks)?  To use Dr. Johnson's (Sam – no relation) comment on seeing a walking dog show – "The wonder is NOT that it is not done well, but that it is done at all!" 

But I can comment on the decorum of this Forum – this discussion was conducted in a rational, polite manner with facts and opinions on all sides taken seriously.  The reason I stay away from most 'social media' is that any disagreement can quickly escalate to a flame war.  Points to the Forum. 

Cheers,
Torrence

[Will]

Many more points to the forum.

Much social media which brings politics into the conversation also sees participants enumerating all the ways that fellow citizens are The Enemy, an existential threat to all that good people find true and hold dear.

The reality is that almost everyone is somewhere in the complicated middle, and the distinction of "us versus them" is really a manufactured construct, probably because it is a human trait to enjoy tribal competition. (Just look at how we view sports teams. Go Hannover '96!)

It's refreshing to discuss issues without objectifying others who disagree as being part of a monolithic Enemy that is full of negative qualities and bereft of virtue.

[Phil Bunch]

Here are further examples of collisions. Why don't we make the regulations on the ground as strict as in the air? Why do we lament there but not here? Why is the tolerance greater here than it is there? This attitude is contradictory, in my opinion.


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Hardy,

I've wondered about this for many years, and I've also concluded that there are (multiple?) psychological effects going on that have kept us from doing rational about air travel safety.  I suspect that (1) people really don't want to die by falling out of the sky, (2) they are afraid of being locked up in a thin metal tube flying at 35,000 feet at ~600 mph, (3) as others have mentioned, the lack of personal control is likely to be an issue for many.

As a result, we have essentially zero risk of dying while a passenger in commercial aviation.  This is truly remarkable as some extremely low probabilities must be reduced to very close to zero.

I have also wondered:  if there were no psych issues in the passengers, what would the death rate be for commercial aviation?  Large airliners are very expensive ($200 million plus) and the lawsuits associated with a crash for say 300 passengers must total to something like $300 million per crash or more.  If the accident rate were more "reasonable" so that say 30,000 or more people die in the USA per year from aviation accidents (as is the case for car accidents), we couldn't afford the tickets!  Maybe it is cheaper to maintain the zero-risk system we have?

In thinking more about the comparison to car insurance costs, perhaps a 30,000/year aviation fatality rate (presumably caused by cheaper pilots plus defective airliners) would be affordable.  In the USA I think insurance for driving a new car costs about $1000/year, so for discussion purposes we could just add that cost to our average airline ticket costs.  At 30,000 deaths per year, and 200 pax per plane, we would then lose 150 airliners per year in the USA.  That's about one crash every 2 days.  Would this be too much for us to accept???  Boeing would get a lot of new business!

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Anyway, I've been puzzled by the zero accident rate for commercial aviation for many years, and continue to suspect that it is not fully rational.  I think it is the only large-scale human endeavor that is so close to zero risk.  If only we could design nuclear reactors to be this safe...

[United744]

Anyway, I've been puzzled by the zero accident rate for commercial aviation for many years, and continue to suspect that it is not fully rational.  I think it is the only large-scale human endeavor that is so close to zero risk.  If only we could design nuclear reactors to be this safe...

They are - they only fail due to human error (usually some maintenance procedure).

At 30,000 deaths per year, and 200 pax per plane, we would then lose 150 airliners per year in the USA.  That's about one crash every 2 days.  Would this be too much for us to accept???

Outrageously so!   Are you being serious?

A point to remember about airline vs. car accidents is this: cars are ever only 2 seconds or less away from disaster, whereas in an airliner, you have perhaps 10 minutes (or more) to deal with a problem.

Also, they let just about anyone drive cars, whereas that isn't the case with airliners.

Third, pilots tend to be more technically minded than most, and consider action vs. consequence before doing something, which again most car drivers don't.

There are exceptions of course, but it all contributes to the safety record.

[Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers]

There probably has been market research how many smoking  holes can appear on TV before the flying audience starts getting nervous and takes their business elsewhere. And how long it takes for said audience to forget the last smoking hole.


Hoppie

Added later:
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/26/politics/air-force-one-refrigerator-contract-boeing/index.html
Not political -- these costs are completely believable for a purpose-engineered one-off military aircraft project from scratch, including structural, DO-160, and all other cert stuff. Just paperwork reviews by Boeing engineers soaks up millions without even trying. It definitely can be done a whole lot cheaper, at more risk. The question will always remain, how much risk is too much?